Judicial Proof of “Knowing” in the Crime of Assisting Information Network Criminal Activities

As the subjective element of the crime of assisting information network criminal activities, “knowing” serves to limit the scope of punishment. However, there are significant theoretical and practical challenges, including unclear conceptual boundaries of “knowing”, ambiguity in identifying proof objects, and the lack of a systemic framework for criminal presumption rules. Against the backdrop of a rapid increase in cases nationwide, the judicial proof of subjective “knowing” urgently needs improvement. First, in terms of the connotations of “knowing”, from the perspective of proof methods, “knowing” can be categorized into two types: “knowing” proven through evidence and “knowing” proven through criminal presumptions. Second, regarding the proof objects of “knowing”, from a semantic and contextual perspective, the proof objects include the actor’s knowledge of the aided person, knowledge of the aided person’s engagement in information network crimes, and knowledge of the illegality of the assistance. Furthermore, the interpretation of “knowing” regarding the aided person’s engagement in crimes should align with behaviors that meet the criminal threshold as defined in the specific provisions of criminal law. Finally, in terms of improving criminal presumption rules, prerequisites for applying criminal presumption after exhausting direct evidence must be established, reasonable doubt standards for rebuttal evidence must be constructed, and abstract generalizations for the core content of catch-all provisions should be proposed.